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COMMENT: MENTAL CAPACITY (AMENDMENT) ACT 2019 (UK) 
 
*LUCY SERIES 
I     INTRODUCTION 
The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 amends the Mental Capacity Act 2005 of 
England and Wales, and replaces the heavily criticised deprivation of liberty safeguards 
(DoLS) with a new administrative framework for authorising deprivation of liberty, the 
Liberty Protection Safeguards (LPS). 
II    BACKGROUND 
 
The DoLS were inserted into the MCA to provide authorisation and safeguards for 
deprivation of liberty in care homes and hospitals following the ‘Bournewood case’. In HL v 
UK1 the European Court of Human Rights had ruled that the informal admission of an autistic 
man to Bournewood Hospital was a deprivation of liberty in the meaning of art 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), notwithstanding that he had not actually 
attempted to leave the hospital.  The DoLS administrative scheme was intended to satisfy the 
procedural requirements of art 5 ECHR. They included a process for formal assessment of 
mental capacity and whether it is in the person’s best interests to be deprived of their liberty, 
and mechanisms for review and appeal. 
The DoLS have been heavily criticised since their inception; in 2014 a House of Lords Select 
Committee on the MCA described them as ‘poorly drafted, overly complex’ and ‘far from 
being used to protect individuals and their rights, they are sometimes used to oppress 
individuals’.2 The Committee called upon the government to ‘start again’. In the same year, 
the Supreme Court adopted a definitive ‘acid test’ on the meaning of ‘deprivation of liberty’ 
for adults who are considered to lack the capacity to consent to their care arrangements in P v 
Cheshire West and Chester Council and another; P and Q v Surrey County Council.3 If a 
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person is subject to continuous supervision and control and is not free to leave, then they are 
deprived of their liberty and require safeguards in accordance with art 5 ECHR.   
Within a year of the Cheshire West decision the number of DoLS applications increased by a 
factor of more than ten.4 Today it is estimated that as many as 300,000 people may be 
deprived of their liberty and require safeguards. The volume of applications is far beyond the 
capacity of the DoLS scheme; over 126,000 applications remain unprocessed by the end of 
2018.5 Furthermore, many of the places where the Cheshire West ‘acid test’ applies are not 
care homes or hospitals, including supported living accommodation and even private family 
homes. The government asked the Law Commission to review the scheme and make 
recommendations for reform. 
 
III   THE LAW COMMISSION’S PROPOSALS 
 
The Law Commission embarked upon a wide ranging consultation and made 
recommendations for a new scheme – the Liberty Protection Safeguards (LPS) – to replace 
the DoLS.6 The new scheme aimed to be more ‘proportionate’, to reduce unnecessary 
‘bureaucracy’, reduce duplication of assessments, and focus scarce professional resources 
where they were most needed.   
Authorisations could be granted for any setting(s) where the arrangements to provide care 
and treatment give rise to a deprivation of liberty; a much more flexible approach than the 
DoLS. This extends the machinery of ar 5 from settings that may more readily be associated 
with detention – such as hospitals and care homes – to include settings like supported living, 
or even care provided to a person living in their own home (including potentially by their 
family).   
Under the new scheme ‘responsible bodies’ would be able to authorise deprivation of liberty 
provided there was medical evidence of ‘unsoundness of mind’, the person lacked the mental 
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capacity to consent to the ‘arrangements’ to deliver care or treatment, and the arrangements 
were ‘necessary and proportionate’ in relation to the risk to the person or to others. 
Responsible bodies would be the hospitals, health bodies or local authorities that would in 
many cases be responsible for arranging or even delivering the person’s care and treatment . 
Although this potentially gave rise to conflicts of interest, it meant the LPS assessments could 
be ‘streamlined’ into existing care planning processes.   
The LPS core assessments include an assessment of the person’s ‘mental capacity’ to consent 
to arrangements to deliver care and treatment that give rise to a deprivation of liberty. The 
Commission proposed a ‘medical assessment’ of whether the person is of ‘unsound mind’ in 
order to ensure strict compliance with the requirements of art 5(1)(e) ECHR. The 
Commission proposed a new ‘necessary and proportionate’ test, which aimed to comply with 
the requirements of art 5 ECHR.  However, whereas its predecessor ‘best interests’ 
assessment under the DoLS only considered risk of harm to the person themselves, the Law 
Commission’s proposed expanding this to include risk of harm to others. 
In the main medical evidence and capacity assessments could come from existing sources – 
such as a patient’s GP or community care assessments, and would not necessarily require 
fresh assessments to be conducted for the LPS – reducing unnecessary duplication.  However, 
it was unclear who would perform these assessments where care was arranged privately. The 
safeguard against potential conflicts of interest is provided via a desktop review by an 
independent person, of whether it is reasonable to believe the criteria for detention under the 
LPS are met.   If the person is reported to be objecting to the arrangements, or the care and 
treatment, (estimated to be 25% of cases overall), an independent Approved Mental Capacity 
Professional (AMCP) would review the application. The AMCP would consult with the 
person and interested parties and take other appropriate actions to determine whether the 
arrangements should be authorise under the LPS, for example undertaking assessments 
themselves, exploring less restrictive options or seeking to resolve any disputes informally. 
The Law Commission acknowledged that the DoLS offered weak safeguards where the 
person or those close to them objected – the appeal rate under the DoLS is under 1% 
suggesting serious problems with access to justice and rights of appeal. The Commission 
recommended expanding statutory independent advocacy to an opt-out scheme, so that most 
people would benefit from an advocate to help them understand and exercise any relevant 
rights.  Each person would also have an ‘appropriate person’ to support and represent them, 
typically this would be a friend or a relative. 
The Commission also proposed wider ranging amendments to the MCA to bring it closer into 
alignment with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). These 
included amending the MCA’s test of best interests to place ‘particular weight’ on the wishes 
and feelings of the person, and inserting into the MCA a power to make regulations to 
establish a statutory supported decision making scheme.   
 
IV THE MENTAL CAPACITY (AMENDMENT) BILL 
 
The government did not engage in further public consultation on the Law Commission’s 
proposals, but brought forward a Bill in July 2018.7 The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill 
included substantial ‘adjustments’ to the Commission’s proposals for the LPS, but had not 
been subject to further debate. The Bill was widely criticised by an alliance of professional 
bodies, human rights and disability organisations, and care providers, and was described at 
one point in the House of Lords as ‘one of the worst pieces of legislation ever brought before 
this House’.8   
There was concern that the Bill had been drafted hastily, contained what appeared to be 
mistakes in places, there had been no proper consultation, and was missing basic supporting 
information like an assessment of the Bill’s impact on groups with protected characteristics 
(particularly older and disabled people) and an easy read version of the Bill to enable 
stakeholders with cognitive impairments to participate in the discussions and debates. In 
short, the Bill bore all the signs of a civil service and government under strain, drafted and 
debated in the shadows of the political crisis that has engulfed the UK concerning Brexit.  
However, the Bill underwent substantial amendments following these criticisms, particularly 
in the House of Lords where the government was defeated on three amendments. Views are 
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still mixed on whether the LPS represent ‘progress’9 or contain significant deficiencies from 
a human rights and practical perspective.10 
The Bill did not include the Commission’s proposed wider amendments to the MCA, such as 
amending the test of best interests or a statutory supported decision-making scheme. Certain 
key safeguards proposed by the Commission were diluted; rights to independent advocacy 
were restricted, and by the government’s own estimates the rate of appeal would fall even 
further to 0.5%. Rights of challenged are significantly diminished.  Despite these 
amendments there is still substantial unease about the Bill, and the relative dilution of 
safeguards for detained persons. Most people will no longer quality for an independent 
assessment – it will depend on whether they are regarded as ‘objecting’.  
Authorisations initially last up to 12 months, and may subsequently be renewed for 12 
months, but then renewals may extend to periods of up to three years with very limited 
independent scrutiny. Similarly, the arrangements may be ‘varied’ with limited independent 
scrutiny. 
The LPS retain an extremely complex interface with the Mental Health Act 1983, although 
this may be an area for future reform in a mental health bill. 
However, the House of Lords did vote to insert rights to information in the Bill, which 
include new general duties upon responsible bodies to produce information about the LPS in 
accessible formats, as well as specific duties to give information to the person and their 
representatives about the grounds for the authorisation and their rights. Embarrassing 
omissions – such as an explicit duty to consult the person themselves about their wishes and 
feelings – were rectified. 
The Bill initially contained controversial new ‘care home arrangements’, whereby care home 
managers would become responsible for the key assessments and would submit these to the 
responsible body for review. This was met by widely expressed concerns – including from 
care providers themselves – that care home managers would have financial conflicts of 
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interest, would lack the skills and expertise to conduct the key assessments, had no available 
resources to undertake the assessments, and would lack knowledge of less restrictive 
alternatives to the care home placement. Under pressure in the House of Lords, this aspect of 
the Bill was amended to state that responsible bodies must decide whether they or the care 
home should take responsibility for arranging the key assessments. If the care home did, then 
new ‘conflict of interest’ regulations would prohibit reliance on assessments by anyone with 
a ‘prescribed connection’ to the care home. This raises questions – still unanswered – as to 
who will conduct these assessments. 
Other elements of the Bill that had been proposed by the Law Commission but not consulted 
on – such as replacing the test of ‘mental disorder’ with a test of ‘unsoundness of mind’, and 
removing the ‘best interests’ test, also gave rise to controversy. The terminology of 
‘unsoundness of mind’ was judged outdated and offensive and replaced during the 
Parliamentary process with the same ‘mental disorder’ test employed by the Mental Health 
Act 1983 and the DoLS.  The Bill as initially introduced by the government did not actually 
specify what the detention should be ‘necessary and proportionate’ in relation to; it was only 
confirmed in passing that the government intended to expand the grounds of detention as the 
Law Commission had proposed to include risk of harm to others. The Lords voted through an 
amendment that only ‘risk of harm to the person’ themselves formed part of this test, and the 
government did not contest this. 
Many stakeholders, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), had 
called for a statutory definition, some seeking clarity, others concerned about the impact of 
the extension of detention safeguards into private family based care settings, and others 
perhaps hoping to stem the tide following Cheshire West.  The difficulty is that it would be 
very hard to introduce a statutory definition of deprivation of liberty that restricts the 
Cheshire West acid test, without in effect setting up a constitutional conflict between the 
definition of ‘deprivation of liberty’ adopted by Parliament and the courts.  Towards the very 
end of the Parliamentary passage, the government introduced a new statutory definit ion of 
‘deprivation of liberty’, ostensibly to ‘clarify’ the meaning of deprivation of liberty.  
However, this particular statutory definition did not reflect the JCHR’s proposed definition 
and conflicted with elements of the Cheshire West decision and wider jurisprudence on art 5 
ECHR.11 The Lords then inserted their own amendment, which also gave rise to concerns 
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about a lack of correspondence with art 5 ECHR. Ultimately, the government withdrew all 
definitions and the final position is that the Code of Practice will provide guidance on the 
meaning of ‘deprivation of liberty’ based on art 5 jurisprudence.  This does not satisfy 
stakeholders hoping to reverse Cheshire West or limit its scope, but does address the 
potentially very serious legal complications of requiring the courts to cope with conflicting 
legal definitions. 
 
V   DISCUSSION 
 
The main goals in reforming the DoLS were to strengthen the safeguards available to 
detained people, to reduce the complexity of the process and legislation, and to ensure a more 
‘proportionate’ use of resources. The 2019 amendments will almost certainly weaken the 
safeguards available to people in care homes and hospitals, but may provide better protection 
to people in settings such as supported living who for the most part have no formal 
safeguards at all under the DoLS. The LPS schedules are shorter than the DoLS, but word 
count is not an indicator of simplicity – the government has stripped out many provisions 
included by the Law Commission that could have clarified how they should operate, and 
there is considerable uncertainty over key questions such as who is responsible for 
conducting the key assessments.  It is likely that many elements of the LPS will be litigated. 
It is extremely hard to say whether the LPS will make substantial savings; in theory many of 
the measures may reduce duplication and limit involvement of scarce professional resources 
to cases where there is greater need. In practice, many elements of the impact assessment are 
dubious – including the suggestion that a person’s GP may assess their capacity12 or that the 
administrative requirements placed on care homes will have zero impact on their resources. 
These are additional burdens on a health and social care system that is increasingly fragile 
and under strain, and it is quite possible some charges will be passed onto the detained person 
themselves.   
Work is already underway on new Codes of Practice and secondary regulations. It is hoped 
by the government that the LPS will be operational by autumn of 2020. 
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